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Online Appendix

Liquidity, liquidity everywhere, not a drop to use

Why flooding banks with central bank reserves may not expand liquidity

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Appendix IV: Alternative Models of Encumbrance on Reserves

IV.1. Endogenizing τ as Encumbrance Share due to Speculation

Reserves, as we argued in the introduction, have an optionality embedded in them. Ideally, banks would like to sell that option for states they do not need it in (when the economy is healthy), and retain it when the economy is liquidity stressed. Unfortunately, such selective sales of liquidity may be difficult.

Below, we sketch a model of how bank prime-brokerage services can expand in line with bank reserves – the model is isomorphic to one of banks issuing contingent lines of credit. Briefly, the model features three ingredients: (i) Speculators, who engage in state-contingent bets with each other because of their private beliefs, incur costs in seeking “prime-brokerage” liquidity support from banks – costs that are declining in the level of bank reserves; (ii) Liquidity support requires banks to fund significant margin calls on the speculator positions in times of stress at date 1;¹ (iii) Banks and clients agree on fees (to be paid at date 2 when speculation is “successful”) to compensate banks for the opportunity cost of encumbered reserves in the form of margins posted at date 1. Since this opportunity cost arises in the liquidity stress state at date 1 when interbank rate premium \bar{r}_1 can exceed zero, prime-brokerage fees rise in \bar{r}_1 . In turn, the size of speculative positions increases in reserves but at a declining rate in \bar{r}_1 , and so does the margin-linked encumbrance, which takes the form $\tau(\bar{r}_1) S_0$, where $\tau'(\bar{r}_1) \leq 0$.

Effectively, this implies then that at low levels of the expected rate \bar{r}_1 , there is greater speculation, and if liquidity needs in the stressed state rise, then speculative activity is tempered by the expectation of a rising interbank rate, creating an additional equilibrating force that clears the market for reserves. Using $\tau'(\bar{r}_1) \leq 0$, and logic analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, it can be shown that

Theorem:

(i) If $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau(0))}{\tau(0)+\varphi(1-\tau(0))}$, then $\bar{r}_1 > 0$ is the unique equilibrium for $S_0 > \hat{S}_0$; \bar{r}_1 increases with S_0

over a range $[\hat{S}_0, \hat{S}_0^*]$ till it reaches r_1^* where $\frac{\varphi(1-\tau(r_1^*))}{\tau(r_1^*)+\varphi(1-\tau(r_1^*))} = \theta$, after which \bar{r}_1 does not increase

with further increases in S_0 . Also $\bar{r}_1 = 0$ for $S_0 \leq \hat{S}_0$.

(ii) If $\theta \leq \frac{\varphi(1-\tau(0))}{\tau(0)+\varphi(1-\tau(0))}$, then $\bar{r}_1 > 0$ is the unique equilibrium for $S_0 < \hat{S}_0$; \bar{r}_1 increases as S_0 falls till it reaches r_1^{**} at $S_0 = \hat{S}_0^{**}$ where $\frac{\varphi(1-\tau(r_1^{**}))}{\tau(r_1^{**})+\varphi(1-\tau(r_1^{**}))} = \theta$, after which \bar{r}_1 does not increase with further decreases in S_0 . Also $\bar{r}_1 = 0$ for $S_0 \geq \hat{S}_0$.

In essence, case (i) which formalizes our novel insight continues to hold with the endogenous modeling for reserves encumbrance. As long as additional reserves create a net demand for liquidity when the interbank rate is zero, that is, $\theta > \frac{\varphi(1-\tau(0))}{\tau(0)+\varphi(1-\tau(0))}$, increasing reserves eventually leads to an interbank rate that is greater than zero. It rises with reserves until the speculative encumbrance τ falls to the point that an incremental increase in reserves does not change the net demand for liquidity (or \bar{r}_1 or $\tau(\bar{r}_1)$). Importantly, reserves encumbrance can be readily endogenized to mirror the reality that banks and speculators have mutual interest in “locking up” reserves for future risk management.

Endogenizing Encumbrance Share due to Speculation

Consider, for example, the prime brokerage services that banks offer. Let each bank serve one speculator. Let the speculator put on trades at date 0 of size x . In normal economic times, the bets pay off and return ηx to the speculator and fees of ρx to the bank. Conditional on the economy getting liquidity stressed (with probability $\frac{q}{\theta}$), the bank has to meet margin calls on the speculator, putting up reserves of κx . These calls have priority over all other claims on the bank (else it will have to default on exchanges, and see its brokerage business shut down).²

Finally, assume each speculator’s search costs of putting on a profitable trade is increasing in the size of a trade (that is, there are fewer remaining low hanging fruit as they trade more) and decreasing in the unencumbered liquidity of the system, so it is $\frac{\nu}{2} \frac{x^2}{(S_0 - \kappa \bar{x})}$, where ν is a parameter and \bar{x} is the equilibrium level of trade per bank. This captures the notion that liquidity facilitates speculation, but

² Alternatively, if the trades are centrally cleared to reduce any risk of contagion from such speculative positions, the clearinghouse would require the clearing members (dealer banks) to over-collateralize their positions and contribute variation margins. The resulting funds with clearinghouses face significant limits on rehypothecation, and a large fraction of it is in the form of reserves deposited with the central bank, thereby being unavailable for further private use.

speculators are aware that liquidity gets tied up as there is more speculative trade. Assume that $\eta > \rho$ which ensures that speculation is profitable net of fees. The speculator's maximization problem is then:

$$\text{Max}_x \quad (1 - \frac{q}{\theta})[\eta - \rho]x - \frac{\nu}{2} \frac{x^2}{(S_0 - \kappa \bar{x})}$$

The first order condition is $(1 - \frac{q}{\theta})[\eta - \rho] = \frac{\nu x}{(S_0 - \kappa \bar{x})}$. Recognizing that $x = \bar{x}$ in equilibrium, we have

$$\kappa \bar{x} = \frac{S_0 \kappa \left(1 - \frac{q}{\theta}\right)(\eta - \rho)}{\nu + \kappa \left(1 - \frac{q}{\theta}\right)(\eta - \rho)} = \tau S_0 \text{ where } \tau = \frac{\kappa \left(1 - \frac{q}{\theta}\right)(\eta - \rho)}{\nu + \kappa \left(1 - \frac{q}{\theta}\right)(\eta - \rho)}.$$

Assuming that the market for provision of prime-brokerage services to speculators is competitive among banks at date 0, the fee ρ per unit of speculative activity is set such that in expectation banks are compensated for the cost of providing the per-unit margin call κ . This zero-profit condition implies then

that $\left(1 - \frac{q}{\theta}\right)\rho = \frac{q}{\theta}[\phi(1 - \theta) + \theta]\bar{r}_1\kappa$.³ Substituting above for the implied $\rho(\bar{r}_1)$, we obtain that the

encumbrance per unit of reserves is a function of the date-1 interbank rate premium; it is $\tau(\bar{r}_1)$, such that $\tau'(\bar{r}_1) \leq 0$. Theorem above (derived analogously to Theorem 1) implies that $\tau(\bar{r}_1)$ never falls to zero, and our assumption that prime-brokerage fee is lower than the speculative return, $\eta > \rho$, always holds in equilibrium. Importantly, the lower is the average or expected margin requirement κ on speculative activity, the greater the ex-ante speculative activity (all else equal), and in turn, the range of parameters for which more reserves can tighten interbank markets.

IV.2. Endogenizing τ as Encumbrance Share due to Regulation

To offset speculation, regulators may place their own encumbrances on reserves (see Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2009) or Calomiris, Heider, and Hoerova (2014)). The most obvious such regulation is a requirement that a certain fraction of assets have to be held at all times in the most liquid form (see, for example, Diamond and Kashyap (2016)) or a capital requirement that binds precisely when a bank ought to lend out its excess reserves (see, for example, Vandeweyer (2019)). Such regulations are likely to be insufficiently contingent.

³ Note that there is no opportunity cost of reserves encumbrance to safe banks that hoard liquidity.

Why cannot such requirements be dropped in times of stress? As Goodhart (2008) emphasizes, a policy of having at least one taxi at the station is of little benefit to the late-arriving traveler if it cannot be used. Diamond and Kashyap (2016) argue, however, that it may make sense for the regulator to prevent a bank from using up liquid reserves in stressed times if the anticipation of use causes the stress to spread – if savers believes healthy banks have no mandated liquid assets and might lend them all to stressed banks, they may run on all banks. We incorporate such regulatory requirements in Online Appendix IV.

Cautious bank behavior in response to uncertain regulation could also amplify encumbrances. D’Avernas and Vanderweyer (2021) attribute enhanced volatility and fragility in repo markets to implicit supervisory mandates on intra-day bank liquidity holdings. They cite Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan *“[...] we have \$120 billion in our checking account at the Fed, and it goes down to \$60 billion and then back to \$120 billion during the average day. But we believe the requirement under CLAR and resolution and recovery is that we need enough in that account, so if there’s extreme stress during the course of the day, it doesn’t go below zero.”* In other words, uncertainty about enforcement appears to have forced JP Morgan to hold a portion of reserves back for really extreme market events – since no one really knows what these might be, some portion of the reserves might be permanently encumbered.

Relatedly, Nelson (2019) documents that in a Bank Policy Institute (BPI) survey conducted in January 2019, bank examiner expectations about liquidity holdings were mentioned overwhelmingly as “important” or “very important” reasons for reserve demand by banks. Indeed, Nelson points out that in times of abundant reserves, bank supervisors scrutinize any drawdowns carefully, creating a ratchet effect (higher the held reserves, higher the reserves supervisor expect) limiting the ability of healthy banks to redeploy reserves when needed. Indeed, a recent discussion paper by the Bank of England (2022) flags such behavior during stress episodes in the pandemic, and seeks (as part of its prudential liquidity framework) to induce banks to use their surplus liquidity even when the system is stressed.

Embedding Liquidity Regulations

In the context of our framework, suppose that after reserves are set and speculation is under way, regulators can affect overall $\tau (= \tau^{Spec} + \tau^{Reg})$ by setting τ^{Reg} . Let the fraction of banks that suffer withdrawals at date 1 be $K(\tau^{Reg})\theta$ instead of θ , with $K' < 0$, $K'' > 0$ and $K(0) = 1$. This means the share of banks that are stressed falls in mandatory regulatory reserve holdings (in part because that also curbs the effects of speculation). However, this also hampers the liquidity available from healthy banks in times of liquidity stress. Hence, if regulators are narrowly focused on maximizing overall liquidity available per dollar of reserves ex post, given the central bank has set reserves, they would maximize

$(1 - \tau) - K(\tau^{\text{Reg}})\theta$. So they would optimally choose $\tau^{\text{Reg}*} = K'^{-1}(-\frac{1}{\theta})$. On inspection, and bearing in mind that risk reduction has diminishing returns so that $K'' > 0$, the higher is θ the greater will be the regulatory encumbrance $\tau^{\text{Reg}*}$. Depending on functional forms, that is, how effectively a higher τ^{Reg} reduces the share of banks that are stressed, it can be shown that all the cases we have discussed earlier could still be possible with optimal regulation. Our model easily allows for an analysis of alternative formulations of the regulatory requirement. For instance, if banks are required to maintain τD_0 of deposits as reserves at all times (that is, a traditional reserve requirement), we can show easily that once again $\tau^{\text{Reg}*} = K'^{-1}(-\frac{1}{\theta})$ since deposit issuance moves one for one with reserves.

IV.3. Fixed Encumbrance on Reserves ($\tau S_0 \equiv \bar{E}$)

Suppose that instead of a constant fraction, the regulatory encumbrance is a fixed amount \bar{E} of required reserves, independent of total reserves, S_0 . Our analysis of Section 2.2 carries over to this case even though with a fixed encumbrance, an increase in reserves cannot shrink ex-post liquidity simply because it is financed with deposits. However, the novelty here is that as long as there is a convenience yield on reserves in the stressed state, an increase in reserves increases the returns to hoarding and staying safe to attract flight-to-quality deposits; this reduces in turn the fraction of surplus banks in the interbank market (which may remain shut altogether).

Fixed Encumbrance on Reserves ($\tau S_0 \equiv \bar{E}$)

Consider the full model of Section 2.2 with the endogenized share of surplus banks in the interbank market. Case 1 in which each stressed bank is self-sufficient in liquidity at the convenience

yield δ arises whenever $\bar{E} \leq \bar{E}^* \equiv \left[\left(q\delta/\alpha_0 + \delta/\alpha_1 \right) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda L_0^2 \right]$, a condition that is

independent of the level of reserves; note that I_1 is the optimized value evaluated at $r_1 = \delta$, I_0 at

$R_0^L = (1 + q\gamma + q\delta)$ and $L_0 = \frac{q\gamma}{\lambda(1 + q\delta)}$. For $\bar{E} > \bar{E}^*$, the interbank market may be shut (autarky) or

open; when shut, the autarkic rate $r_1^A(\bar{E})$ satisfies $\bar{E} = \left[\left(qr_1^A/\alpha_0 + r_1^A/\alpha_1 \right) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda L_0^2 \right]$,

and is now a function of the fixed level of encumbrance and not of the level of reserves, with I_1 , I_0 and L_0 set accordingly. Naturally, $r_1^A(\bar{E})$ is increasing in the encumbrance \bar{E} , and $r_1^A(\bar{E}) > \delta$ for $\bar{E} > \bar{E}^*$.

A key question then is when is the autarkic rate above or below the breakeven rate r_1^φ that induces banks to lend in the interbank market. With fixed encumbrance, this rate is given by

$$r_1^\varphi = \alpha_1 (S_0 - \bar{E}) \left[\sqrt{1 + \frac{2\delta}{\alpha_1(1-\theta)(S_0 - \bar{E})}} - 1 \right], \text{ which as before is increasing and concave in } S_0. \text{ Note}$$

also that the endogenous share φ of surplus banks that lend in the interbank market for a given rate r_1

$$\text{satisfies } (1-\varphi) = \frac{\delta(S_0 - \bar{E})}{(1-\theta) \left(r_1(S_0 - \bar{E}) + \frac{r_1^2}{2\alpha_1} \right)} \text{ and the equilibrium interbank rate } \bar{r}_1 \text{ is given by the}$$

usual market-clearing condition adjusted for encumbrance being now at a fixed level:

$$\frac{r_1}{\alpha_1} = \frac{\theta}{[\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta]} \left[I_0 + I_1 - e_0 + \frac{1}{2} \lambda (L_0^B)^2 - W_0^F \right] - \frac{\varphi(1-\theta)}{[\varphi(1-\theta) + \theta]} S_0 + \bar{E}. \text{ It can then be shown that}$$

Theorem: For $S_0 > \bar{E} > \bar{E}^*$, there exists a critical threshold $\bar{S}_0 > \bar{E}$ such that

- (i) For $S_0 \in (\bar{E}, \bar{S}_0)$, the autarkic rate $r_1^A(\bar{E})$ exceeds the breakeven rate $r_1^\varphi(S_0)$, the interbank market is open ($\varphi > 0$), and the equilibrium interbank rate $\bar{r}_1 \in (r_1^\varphi(S_0), r_1^A(\bar{E}))$.
- (ii) For $S_0 \geq \bar{S}_0$, the autarkic rate $r_1^A(\bar{E})$ is at or below the breakeven rate $r_1^\varphi(S_0)$, the interbank market is shut ($\varphi = 0$), and the equilibrium interbank rate \bar{r}_1 equals the autarkic rate $r_1^A(\bar{E}) > \delta$.
- (iii) When fixed encumbrance \bar{E} is sufficiently small such that $r_1^A(\bar{E}) < r_1^\varphi(S_0 \rightarrow \infty) = \frac{\delta}{(1-\theta)}$, then both cases (i) and (ii) arise and \bar{r}_1 is strictly increasing in S_0 for at least some range of S_0 in $(\bar{E}, \bar{S}_0]$; otherwise, when $r_1^A(\bar{E}) \geq \frac{\delta}{(1-\theta)}$, only case (i) arises and $\bar{S}_0 \rightarrow \infty$.

Proof of Theorem: Following earlier derivations, but with a fixed encumbrance, we know

$$r_1^\varphi = \alpha_1 (S_0 - \bar{E}) \left[\sqrt{1 + \frac{2\delta}{\alpha_1(1-\theta)(S_0 - \bar{E})}} - 1 \right]. \text{ Clearly } r_1^\varphi \rightarrow 0 \text{ as } S_0 \rightarrow \bar{E}. \text{ Also, } r_1^\varphi \rightarrow \frac{\delta}{(1-\theta)} \text{ as } S_0 \rightarrow \infty.$$

Finally, r_1^φ is increasing in S_0 . We also know that r_1^A is the value of r_1 that solves

$$\bar{E} = \left[\left(\frac{qr_1}{\alpha_0} + \frac{r_1}{\alpha_1} \right) + W_0^F - I_0 - I_1 - \frac{1}{2} \lambda L_0^2 \right], \text{ where } I_0, I_1, L_0 \text{ depend on } r_1 \text{ in the usual manner.}$$

Since none of the elements on the right hand side change with S_0 , r_1^A does not change with S_0 .

Therefore, if $r_1^A < \frac{\delta}{(1-\theta)}$ because \bar{E} is small, there is an $\bar{S}_0 > \bar{E}$ such that $r_1^\varphi = r_1^A$ at $S_0 = \bar{S}_0$, and

$r_1^\varphi > r_1^A$ for $S_0 > \bar{S}_0$. So the equilibrium interbank rate $\bar{r}_1 \in (r_1^\varphi(S_0), r_1^A(\bar{E}))$ for $\bar{S}_0 > S_0 > \bar{E} > \bar{E}^*$ and

$\bar{r}_1 = r_1^A(\bar{E})$ for $S_0 \geq \bar{S}_0$. If, however, $r_1^A \geq \frac{\delta}{(1-\theta)}$, then $r_1^\varphi < r_1^A$ for all finite S_0 , and the equilibrium

interbank rate $\bar{r}_1 \in (r_1^\varphi(S_0), r_1^A(\bar{E}))$ for all finite S_0 . Q.E.D.




Figure 5A: Market Rate and Reserves

$$\bar{E} = 0.87, \theta = 0.6$$




Figure 5B: Market Rate and Reserves

$$\bar{E} = 1.25, \theta = 0.6$$

Figure 5: Numerical example for the effect of varying the fixed encumbrance on reserves \bar{E} in the model of section 2.2⁴

⁴ Note that the equilibrium interbank rate is rising in the level of reserves; in general, this holds when the systemic extent of liquidity shock θ is sufficiently small and the convenience yield δ is sufficiently high; when this is not

We illustrate the result with examples in Figures 5A and 5B, with the same parameters as in Figures 3-4 ($\theta = 0.6$). When \bar{E} is low, the interbank market is open for low levels of S_0 but shuts down at high levels (Panel A); when \bar{E} is high, the interbank market is always open regardless of the level of S_0 . In both parameterizations, \bar{r}_1 is strictly increasing in S_0 . It is therefore a robust feature of the equilibrium that the interbank market may remain shut and the interbank rate can increase in the level of reserves when the interbank market is open.

the case, it can be shown that an increase in the supply of reserves can cause the rate to decrease as it starts out high, close to the autarkic rate, when reserves are close to the fixed encumbrance, and then decreases towards the breakeven rate.

Appendix V: Maturity Matching or Short-term Financing of Reserves by Shadow Banks

We have assumed that the reserves end up on bank balance sheets. What if the central bank departs from normal practice and allows non-bank financial firms to hold reserves directly? Unless the central bank buys money-like assets from the non-bank private sector, we may not get significantly different outcomes; if the central bank buys long-term financial assets and pays with reserves, for standard risk management reasons the non-bank private sector may want to match the maturity of their liability structure to their shorter-maturity asset holdings.

To see this, let us focus on the healthy state (that is, assume $q = 0$), and assume that economy-wide date-1 short-term (gross) interest rates in the healthy state are $(1 + r)$ with probability p and $(1 - r)$ with probability $(1 - p)$. The net rates $(+r$ and $-r)$ represent the state-contingent cost of rolling over each bank's liquidity shortfall given by $(D_0 - S_0)$. Further, assume the financial firm holding reserves wants to finance it so as to minimize costs, but it also dislikes the variability of its date-2 profits given by the variance of profits, $p(1-p)4r^2(D_0 - S_0)^2$, with aversion parameter $\psi/2$. Finally, the cost of capital issuance at date 0 is $R_0^E = [p(1+r) + (1-p)(1-r) + \Delta_0^E]$, where Δ_0^E is a capital risk premium. So ignoring the other activities of the financial firm, its objective function for choosing the maturity structure of its liabilities, given the need to finance reserve holdings, is as follows (where variables have their earlier connotation):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{D_0} \quad & \left[-R_0^E e_0 - p(1+r)(D_0 - S_0) - (1-p)(1-r)(D_0 - S_0) - \frac{\psi}{2} p(1-p)4r^2(D_0 - S_0)^2 \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & e_0 = S_0 - D_0 \end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward from the maximization that $D_0 = \left[S_0 + \frac{\Delta_0^E}{\psi p(1-p)4r^2} \right]$. So deposits increase one for one with reserves and also increase with the capital premium – the point is that longer term financing for reserves can increase the variability of profits by locking in financing costs while leaving returns on reserves variable. Financial firms will match maturity to avoid this variability. Put differently, so long as central-bank-issued reserves have to be financed somewhere in the economy rather than resting in household balance sheets, there will be some offsetting short-term liabilities.

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