Sannikov, Yuliy Assistant Professor of Finance Joined Stern 2006 Phone: (212) 998-0913 Fax: (212) 995-4233 Email:  ysanniko@stern.nyu.edu Office: KMEC 9-84 44 West Fourth Street Suite 9-190 New York, NY 10012-1126

Education:

• PhD in Business Administration   Stanford  2004
• AB in Mathematics     Princeton  2000

Teaches:

• Financial Management

Research Interests:

• Contract Theory
• Corporate Finance
• Security Design
• Game Theory
• Dynamic Incentives

Professional Experience:

• July 2004 - present Assistant Professor, Economics Department, UC Berkeley
• Fall 2003 Lecturer, Economics Department, Stanford University

Publications:

• “Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model,” with Peter DeMarzo, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance
• “Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time.”
• New Version: “A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem.”
• “Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production,” with Andrzej Skrzypacz
• “Agency Problems, Screening and Increasing Credit Lines.”
• “The Role of Information in Games with Frequent Actions,” with Andrzej Skrzypacz
• "Reputation Effects and Degenerate Equilibria in Continuous-Time Games," with Eduardo Faingold
• "Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: Connection between Discrete and Continuous Time," coming soon
• "Competitive Contracting and Employment Dynamics," with Day Manoli, coming soon