The years 1994 and 1995 did indeed bring fewer mergers
nationally and less merger work for Wachtell. But in that period, there were many corporate bankruptcies
and many bank reorganizations, and Wachtell suddenly
emerged as a leading
The decline is merger activity was short-lived, and after
just a few years, Wachtell again had much M&A
work. Table 1 shows the recent M&A activity by top
Table 1. M&A
Activity by US Law Firms (American Lawyer, April 1999 and April 2000; Mergers and Acquisitions Journal, Feb. 1, 2000)
|
||
Ranked by M&A Deal
Value in 1998
|
Ranked by Proceeds from
M&A in 1999
|
Ranked by Number of
M&A Deals from 1990 to 1999
|
Wachtell,
Lipton |
Skadden, Arps |
Skadden, Arps
|
Skadden, Arps
|
Cravath, Swaine
|
Sullivan,
Cromwell
|
Sullivan,
Cromwell
|
Wachtell, Lipton
|
Dorsey
& Whitney |
Shearman, |
|
Simpson Thacher
|
Cleary,
Gottlieb |
Shearman, |
Shearman,
|
|
Simpson Thacher
|
Gibson, Dunn
|
Simpson Thacher
|
Cleary,
Gottlieb
|
Latham
& Watkins |
Jones, Day
|
King &
Spalding
|
|
Dewey Ballantine
|
Weil, Gotshal
|
Wachtell, Lipton
|
Baker & Botts
|
Sullivan,
Cromwell
|
Wilson Sonsini
|
In 1999, Wachtell continued to
stand out on general performance measures. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show revenues per
lawyer, profits per partner, and profit margins for the top 20 US law firms.
Indeed, one could argue that Wachtell occupied a more
outstanding position in 1999 than it had in 1989-90. According to Alison
Frankel (2000), “In the last
10 years we've seen an increasing percentage of the highest-end (and
best-paying) litigation and deal work consolidating at fewer and fewer elite
firms -- all New York-based. In fact, throughout the 1990s, just 10 firms --
again, all headquartered in New York -- dominated our revenue-per-lawyer and
profits-per-partner rankings. They are the Winners of the Nineties, listed here
in order of their dominance: Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz; Cravath, Swaine
& Moore; Sullivan & Cromwell; Davis Polk & Wardwell;
Cahill, Gordon & Reindel; Simpson Thacher & Bartlett; Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton; Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom; Debevoise
& Plimpton; and Shearman & Sterling.”
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the numbers of lawyers working in these firms, the numbers of partners, and the numbers of lawyers per partner (leverage). Wachtell has expanded about 40%, but the number of partners has increased only 10%, so there are now more associates per partner. Still, Wachtell has the lowest ratio of associates per partner among the top firms.
Figures 1 to 6 are based on data published in the American Lawyer in July 2000.
As the three surviving founders have continued to practice law, there is no evidence about the effects of succession. But a new challenge or opportunity has surfaced – “The New Economy.” As one result, in the summer of 2000, Wachtell was again considering whether to open a branch office outside New York City, this time in Silicon Valley.
The original article did not give enough emphasis to one
component of Wachtell’s success: the firm’s repeated
ability to extract effective strategic policies from its experience. The
founding partners’ experiences as associate lawyers led them to formulate Wachtell’s radical personnel policies. An early difficulty
with a very important client, together with the need to surmount entry
barriers, inspired an emphasis on transactional practice. Experience working
together while the firm was still very small triggered an emphasis on teamwork.
Interaction with investment bankers suggested the possibility of fees based on
outcomes rather than hours worked. Observing that a large corporation had been
unable to obtain legal service over a weekend led Wachtell
to adopt a policy of 24-hour-7-day service. Success in circumventing established precedents
taught lessons about surprise and innovation. After initial success with the
Poison Pill, Wachtell created Poison Pills for many
clients.
Although many, many law firms must have had experiences similar to Wachtell’s, the other firms did not convert those
experiences into ideas about how they might be able to innovate. Furthermore,
after Wachtell innovated, the other firms were slow
to imitate Wachtell’s innovations and they usually
made weak commitments to the innovations. One reason for this might be the
loose, individualistic structures of most law firms. Managing partners often
lack authority and they may not receive much respect; central coordination is
usually weak and individual partners usually have much autonomy. By contrast,
especially during the early years, the founding partners of Wachtell
operated as a unified coalition that was small enough to formulate innovative
policies and strong enough to control the other partners. Evidently, this
coalition was also good at extracting valuable lessons from the firm’s
experience.
References
Alison
Frankel (2000) “Edifice Lex” The American Lawyer,
July 5, 2000