Underwriter Reputation, Issuer-Underwriter Matching, and SEO Performance

Charles Calomiris, Yehuda Izhakian and Jaime Zender

Abstract

The role of underwriters is altered in new seasoned equity offering deal types in which the offering follows quickly after its announcement. Controlling for the endogenous matching between issuing firms and underwriters, we find increased underwriter reputation mitigates the immediate price impact of announcing an accelerated bookbuilt offering, exacerbates the price impact of announcing a bought offering, and has no immediate price impact for fully marketed deals. In contrast, underwriter reputation positively affects price outcomes for fully marketed deals around the offer date. The improved pricing associated with the use of a more reputable underwriter is associated with higher total fees but a lower fee-to-proceeds ratio. Reputation effects are not apparent in the absence of controlling for the endogenous matching.