• Aftermarket Power and Basic Market Competition [Revised September 2009] (An older draft was circulated as CEPR DP 6802, NYU Stern WP EC-08-20.)
• Spin-offs: Theory and Evidence from the Early U.S. Automobile Industry (with Zhu Wang, Kansas City Fed) [July 2009]
• Vertical Integration and Right of First Refusal (with Helder Vasconcelos, Universidade Catolica do Porto) [July 2009]
• Technology Uncertainty, Sunk Costs, and Industry Shakeout [June 2009]
• Dynamic Price Competition wiht Network Effects [Revised March 2009] (An older draft was circulated as CEPR DP 6802, NYU Stern WP EC-08-04.)
• Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation (with David Salant, Toulouse School of Economics) [Revised March 2009] (A previous draft was circulated as NYU Stern WP EC-08-16.)
• Small Switching Costs Lead to Lower Equilibrium Prices [November 2008], forthcoming in Journal of Marketing Research
• Switching Costs and Equilibrium Prices [August 2008]
• Duopoly Competition with Common Shareholders (with Duarte Brito, Universidade Nova de Lisboa; and Helder Vasconcelos, Universidade Catolica do Porto) [September 2008].
• Business as Usual: A Consumer Search Theory of Sticky Prices and Asymmetric Price Adjustment (with Arthur Fishman, Bar-Ilan) [Revised August 2008]
• The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay (with Ali Hortaçsu, U Chicago) [Revised August 2008] (Older drafts were circulated as CEPR DP 4345 and NBER WP 10363; and NYU Stern WP 06-32.) Forthcoming in Journal of Industrial Economics
• Lock in and Switch: Asymmetric Information and New Product Diffusion [Revised April 2008]. (A previous draft was circulated as NYU Stern WP EC-07-11.)
• Barriers to Entry and Industry Turnover: A Puzzle and a Possible Solution [Revised January 2008]
• Dominant Firms, Imitation, and Incentives to Innovate (with Ben Polak, Yale U) [January 2007], CEPR DP 4577, NYU Stern WP EC-07-06.

• The paper Multimarket Contact Under Imperfect Observability, With an Application to Umbrella Branding (1998) turned into Optimal Brand Umbrella Size (2007), then into Umbrella Branding with Imperfect Observability and Moral Hazard, published in IJIO.
• Football, Sailing, and R&D: Dynamic Competition with Strategic Choice of Variance and Co-Variance. This paper, winner of the longest-title award, was turned into two papers: R&D Competition When Firms Choose Variance, published in JEMS; and Increasing Dominance With No Efficiency Effect, published in JET. See the publications page for details. A follow-up to these papers is Go for Broke or Play it Safe? Dynamic Competition with Choice of Variance, published in RJE.
• Entry Mistakes, CEPR Working Paper No. 1729, was published in EER under the title Simultaneous Entry and Welfare.
• R&D Alliances as Non-cooperative Supergames, CEPR Working Paper No. 1439, was published in IJIO as R and D Cooperation and Product Market Competition.
• Learning to Compete and Vice-versa, Boston University's ISP Working Paper No. 39 (1992), was published in Econometrica as The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing.

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